Here's one more to the ongoing list of what makes macroeconomics so hard. This one is appropriate for the current situation: an excessive focus on price data.
Business cycles are fundamentally about quantity variables: unemployment, industrial production, housing starts, and so on. Yes, we're concerned about real income, and yes that can be reduced by inflation, but it is just a proxy for our ability to buy quantities of stuff and it is primarily based on the quantity of work we perform for others.
We may or may not be in a recession right now, but most of the talk we hear in the legacy media is useless for assessing this.
Think about it: they focus on interest rates, stock market indices, exchange rates, and so on. What we have there is a price of borrowed money, a price of equity, and a price of currency. Even mortgage write-downs are just the restatement of balance sheet items derived from prices.
The problem with prices is that if they benefit anyone, they also hurt someone. The assertion that they are informative about business cycles relies on an assumption that there is a right price, and that deviations from that can tip the cost/benefit scale. This isn't usually the case.
This week the Fed lowered interest rates, and we are now seeing the blizzard of opinions about whether this is good or bad. But, this is just an intermediate target. What the Fed really wants is for that to translate into purchases of quantities of stuff made by quantities of hours worked by real people in industries that are elastic with respect to interest rates. Figuring out if that took place isn't as immediate as reporting on the interest rate change, and considerably more time consuming.
A similar argument can be made for stock prices. Yes, people who are losing money on the stock market may reduce their real purchases. But, those are just the sellers. Every transaction has a buyer, and they are laughing all the way to the bank, and likely to purchase more real stuff because of their new found wealth.
Lastly, let's look at the mortgage crisis. What's going on here is a transfer of wealth. The houses are still there. They are a real thing, and somebody owns them. The crisis is about whether the paper wealth matches up with the real wealth. If it doesn't, again there is a winner and a loser. The uncertainty associated with that has definitely created a macroeconomic coordination problem between builders, financers, and buyers. But, that the real problem: coordination, as pointed out by New Keynesian theorists 20 years ago.
None of this is intended to minimize current problems, or the risks in the near future.
But ... let me stand up and state clearly that recessions are about quantities, and there's precious little evidence that the pundits are as focused on those quantities as they should be. If you pay attention, I'm not the only one making this point (here's one example).